Falls jemand Interesse hat, kann ich nun auch Textteile aus Bamyeh´s Buch "Of Death And Dominion" (2007), indem es um die Bedeutung des Todes für Herrschaftsstrukturen (politische Systeme) geht, als pN verschicken ...
Hier aber etwas über Bamyehs Beiträge zum ANP (Asian Nationalism Projekt), dass ein 2003-2004 laufendes, interdisziplinäres, wissenschaftliches Kolloqium über nationalistische Entwicklungen in Asien darstellte.
Der Link dazu : www.web.uvic.ca/~anp. Ihr findet die Beiträge dort dann unter den beiden Workshopordnern !
Unter dem Link gibt es auch einen Videoauschnitt eines diesbezüglichen Vortags von M.Bamyeh zu sehen.
Noch der Abstract eines der dortigen Arbeistitel von B. zum Projektteil: Global Affinities Beyond the State: Lessons From the Historical Structures of Muslim Society.
The paper is oriented toward three goals: 1. Contesting the notion of “oriental despotism” by bringing attention to largely stable principles of self-organization of civil society throughout much of global Muslim society until the modern period; 2. stressing how “despotism” is essentially a function of modern states, i.e. a result of increased state power over society since the colonial period; and 3. examining how the historical principles of self-organization of global Muslim civil society constitute now, though under different names, the fundamentals of any new global civil society beyond the dictates of state power or imperialism.
In this light, the paper proceeds by identifying three fundamental historical principles of self-organization of global Muslim society:
Partial control: Until the reforms of Mohammad Ali in early 19th century Egypt, the Egyptian state had exemplified a pattern of partial control which had typified Muslim polities throughout history and distinguished them from European city- and then nation-states. Until then but also for a long time afterwards, the state in much of the Muslim world was historically regarded (by constituents and rulers alike) as only one among several sources of legitimate authority in society. Its control was territorially limited to major cities. Beyond the cities but sometimes even within them control had to be shared with other networks of religious authorities, tribal notables, merchant guilds, Sufi orders, and vast networks of extended families.
Free movement: Corollary to the principle above was a principle of free movement of pilgrims, adventurers, merchants and various communities throughout the massive Dar al-Islam, in spite of the division of the Islamic world between various political centers of powers for most of its history. Travel eased the demographic pressures thereby alleviating the concentration of social troubles, offered vital channels of communication between intellectual communities, provided for a distinct global civil society forged across the great urban centers (nominally under jurisdiction of different sovereigns), and endowed especially the cities with a vibrant multicultural fabric.
Cultural heteroglossia: The understanding of society as a constellation of milal (or millets) did not for much of Muslim history necessarily contradict the alternative stress on a unitary umma. Since its origins Islam has stereotypically been understood (by its defenders and detractors alike) as a house of harmony, perfect social order, or collective conformity. In practice, however, Islam operated in the spiritual, legal, moral, and political realms as a highly hybrid and varied practice. The overemphasized Sunni “orthodoxy” of mainstream Islam lived with a more “customary” Islam, in which various folk traditions were intermingled, as well as with a diversity of schools and interpretive juridical modes.
The paper proceeds then to argue that these same patterns seem to be reemerging today due to a combination of opportunities and demands. Opportunities include notably the failure of most states in the region to become modern, “sovereign” entities, to resolve perennial national conflicts, and their (yet to be fully expressed) need to redefine their role in society in tandem with new economic and demographic realities. These old structures are also reemerging because they seem now to correspond better than state-centered logic to communicative trends, political values, and civic ethics associated with cultural as well as political globalization.
Viel Spass beim Lesen !!
Hier aber etwas über Bamyehs Beiträge zum ANP (Asian Nationalism Projekt), dass ein 2003-2004 laufendes, interdisziplinäres, wissenschaftliches Kolloqium über nationalistische Entwicklungen in Asien darstellte.
Der Link dazu : www.web.uvic.ca/~anp. Ihr findet die Beiträge dort dann unter den beiden Workshopordnern !
Unter dem Link gibt es auch einen Videoauschnitt eines diesbezüglichen Vortags von M.Bamyeh zu sehen.
Noch der Abstract eines der dortigen Arbeistitel von B. zum Projektteil: Global Affinities Beyond the State: Lessons From the Historical Structures of Muslim Society.
The paper is oriented toward three goals: 1. Contesting the notion of “oriental despotism” by bringing attention to largely stable principles of self-organization of civil society throughout much of global Muslim society until the modern period; 2. stressing how “despotism” is essentially a function of modern states, i.e. a result of increased state power over society since the colonial period; and 3. examining how the historical principles of self-organization of global Muslim civil society constitute now, though under different names, the fundamentals of any new global civil society beyond the dictates of state power or imperialism.
In this light, the paper proceeds by identifying three fundamental historical principles of self-organization of global Muslim society:
Partial control: Until the reforms of Mohammad Ali in early 19th century Egypt, the Egyptian state had exemplified a pattern of partial control which had typified Muslim polities throughout history and distinguished them from European city- and then nation-states. Until then but also for a long time afterwards, the state in much of the Muslim world was historically regarded (by constituents and rulers alike) as only one among several sources of legitimate authority in society. Its control was territorially limited to major cities. Beyond the cities but sometimes even within them control had to be shared with other networks of religious authorities, tribal notables, merchant guilds, Sufi orders, and vast networks of extended families.
Free movement: Corollary to the principle above was a principle of free movement of pilgrims, adventurers, merchants and various communities throughout the massive Dar al-Islam, in spite of the division of the Islamic world between various political centers of powers for most of its history. Travel eased the demographic pressures thereby alleviating the concentration of social troubles, offered vital channels of communication between intellectual communities, provided for a distinct global civil society forged across the great urban centers (nominally under jurisdiction of different sovereigns), and endowed especially the cities with a vibrant multicultural fabric.
Cultural heteroglossia: The understanding of society as a constellation of milal (or millets) did not for much of Muslim history necessarily contradict the alternative stress on a unitary umma. Since its origins Islam has stereotypically been understood (by its defenders and detractors alike) as a house of harmony, perfect social order, or collective conformity. In practice, however, Islam operated in the spiritual, legal, moral, and political realms as a highly hybrid and varied practice. The overemphasized Sunni “orthodoxy” of mainstream Islam lived with a more “customary” Islam, in which various folk traditions were intermingled, as well as with a diversity of schools and interpretive juridical modes.
The paper proceeds then to argue that these same patterns seem to be reemerging today due to a combination of opportunities and demands. Opportunities include notably the failure of most states in the region to become modern, “sovereign” entities, to resolve perennial national conflicts, and their (yet to be fully expressed) need to redefine their role in society in tandem with new economic and demographic realities. These old structures are also reemerging because they seem now to correspond better than state-centered logic to communicative trends, political values, and civic ethics associated with cultural as well as political globalization.
Viel Spass beim Lesen !!